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The commercial practice of knowingly selling below cost with the intent to injure
competitors or to injure competition has long been considered unlawful by American
courts and state legislatures.! The practice of below cost selling is usually called
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1. See Robert B. Jones, Comment, Regulation of Business-Sales-Below-Cost-Statutes-The Elements of
Violation and the Defense of Meeting Competition, 58 MicH. L. REv. 905, 905-10 (1960). Beginning with South
Carolina in 1902, 31 states had enacted statutes prohibiting below cost sales by 1958. Id.
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"predatory" pricing,2 while a variation of the practice is known as "loss leader"
pricing These practices have been prohibited by federal and California law for over
fifty years,4 but the scope and current nature of the state and federal prohibitions
differ significantly.
While federal predatory price prohibitions are much better known, the change
in the economic perspective of federal antitrust courts has resulted in a dramatic
narrowing of the application of those laws. Meanwhile, the California statutory
prohibitions continue to have the broadest possible application. This is principally
because the California statute was drafted to apply to a much broader range of com-
mercial activity than the federal laws,5 and the operational concept of "cost" now
used in federal courts is both restrictive and problematic when compared to the
precise definition of the term found in California statutes.6 The federal antitrust law
applicable to business activity in California is, for the most part, controlled by
opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the dif-
ference between California law and the law developed in Ninth Circuit opinions on
predatory pricing is very dramatic.7 While the federal antitrust statutes applied to
predatory pricing are generally familiar to trade regulation attorneys throughout the
country, the California statute, which is the Unlawful Practices Act' (UPA or Act),
2. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-27 (1993)
(reviewing federal "predatory pricing" decisions of the last 30 years in considering an alleged violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911) (noting the significance of
predatory pricing under section 2 of the Sherman Act); see also infra Part II.A. (discussing section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
3. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (West 1987); infra Part III.
4. See infra Parts 1,1 (discussing laws prohibiting the general practice of predatory pricing); see also infra
Part III (discussing the more specific statutory prohibition of loss leader pricing).
5. See infra Part U. B.1.
6. See infra Part LC.
7. The views of the Ninth Circuit on measuring predatory price law cost are singular in being narrow and
unclear. See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text. Therefore, the state-federal law comparison of the predatory
price cost concept contained in this Article is more extreme than would be the case were the comparison between
the federal and state laws applicable to predatory pricing in a state located in a different federal circuit.
8. CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). The Act prohibits territorial price
discrimination in § 17040, as well as predatory pricing in § 17043, see infra Part II.B.I., loss leader pricing in §
17044, see infra Part I, and secret rebates in § 17045. The UPA prohibition of territorial price discrimination, as
a practical matter, is very similar to the prohibition of "primary line" price discrimination contained in sections 2(a)
and 2(b) of the federal Robinson-Patman Act (RPA); the only significant difference being that the UPA prohibition
applies to discrimination in the sale of any type of product, while the RPA applies to discrimination only in the sale
of goods. Compare CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17024 (West 1987) with 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (West 1973).
Recent opinions addressing § 17040 claims include: Harris v. Capitol Records Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454,460-61,
413 P.2d 139, 143-44, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543-44 (1966) (discussing distinctions between primary and secondary
competition in § 17040 claims); ABC Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 393, 400-01,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 420 (1995), review granted, 912 P.2d 1146, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199 (1996) (unpublished)
(affirming the dismissal of a UPA claim because of the plaintiff's failure to show primary line injury); and Penner
v. Breitling, No. C-93-4308 Sl, 1996 WL 182202, *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 1996) (holding that the plaintiff, an owner
of a retail watch store, offered insufficient evidence to support a locality discrimination claim against a watch
distributor). The California and federal law on price discrimination and secret rebates are beyond the scope of this
Article.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 28
is known by a small fraction of the lawyers practicing in the state. Given the impor-
tance of the California market to the majority of the nation's businesses, the UPA and
its application to predatory pricing practices should be appreciated by all trade
regulation attorneys. The possibility of large treble damage judgments under the
UPA 9 and the fact that the California statute has been copied in other states l°are
additional reasons why the Act and the case law interpreting it should be better
known.
In private litigation, two provisions of the federal antitrust law have been held
to prohibit predatory pricing: section 2 of the Sherman Act"t and section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act (RPA).'2 A more detailed discussion of the terms of these
sections is in subparts I.B. and II.A., 3 but it should now be noted that section 2 of
the Sherman Act makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize.., any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, 14 and the RPA makes it
unlawful for a seller "to discriminate in price between different purchasers" of goods
sold in interstate commerce "where the effect of such discrimination may be... to
9. See infra Part I.B.4. (discussing damages under the UPA).
10. The UPA was the first modem comprehensive state predatory pricing statute. See Jones, supra note 1,
at 908; J. Thomas McCarthy, Whatever Happened to the Small Businessman? The California Unfair Practices Act,
2 U.S.F. L. REv. 165, 169 (1968). The California statute had its roots in 1913 legislation prohibiting unfair
competition and discrimination. Ewald T. Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting
Price Cutting, 24 CAL. L. REV. 640, 645 (1936); see 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 276, at 508-10 (enacting the UPA). The
initial statute apparently was not widely used except in the public utility field and was, for the most part, "dormant."
Grether, supra, at 645.
The UPA was amended in 1935 by the addition of the defense of meeting competition. See Jones, supra note
1, at 908; see also 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 477, at 1546 (amending the UPA). During the next two years, six states
(Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, and Wyoming) adopted legislation almost identical to the 1935
California statute. In 1937 the UPA was again amended to require that the below cost seller had "a purpose to
injure competitors or to injure competition." Jones, supra note 1, at 909 n.35 (emphasis added); see CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1987).
Currently, the six original states that adopted the UPA have retained language nearly identical to the California
act after the 1937 amendments. The major exception to this statement is the "injurious intent" provision. See ARa.
CODE ANN. § 4-75-209 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (West Supp. 1992); HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 481-3 (Michie 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.030 (Michie 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-209
(1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-107 (Michie 1993). At the present time a large number of the states have
predatory pricing laws much like the UPA. See Jonathan Moore Peterson, Comment, Taming the Sprawlmart:
Using an Antitrust Arsenal to Further Historic Preservation Goals, 27 URB. LAw. 333, 356-64 (1995). These laws
typically prohibit below cost sales with injurious intent. Id. at 358.
11. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 1973 & Supp. 1996).
12. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13-13b, 21a (West 1973). The provision of the RPA that prohibits below cost selling
directly is section 3, which is enforced exclusively by the United States Department of Justice by criminal
prosecutions. See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238 F.2d 86,90 (7th Cir. 1956), aft'd, 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
Because there is no private remedy for a violation of section 3 of the RPA, that section is beyond the scope of this
Article. RPA section 2(a) private enforcement cases have sometimes involved predatory pricing, but the factual
context for that pricing always involved price discrimination. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Parts I.B., I.A.
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1996).
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injure . .. competition."'" Through case law interpretation described below,
"predatory" price sales have sometimes been declared illegal, either when the seller
is a monopolist under section 2 of the Sherman Act or when the seller discriminates
in price between two buyers in the interstate sale of goods under section 2 of the
RPA.16 Under both statutes a predatory price is now held to be one that is below the
seller's costs.'7
Business and Professions Code § 17043 in the California UPA specifically
prohibits sales of any product "at less than the cost thereof.., for the purpose of
injuring competitors or destroying competition.!i8 The purpose or "intent" require-
ment is not particularly daunting due to a statutory presumption. 19
In predatory pricing litigation under any of the three statutes, the crucial deter-
mination is what constitutes the seller's cost on a given sale. The UPA specifies a
measure of cost to be used,2' but the applicable federal cost concept, developed
through case law, is more ambiguousY' Complicating the matter further is the fact
that the topic of cost definition involves issues and terms unfamiliar to many law-
yers.2 Nonetheless, the difference in cost concepts will be the controlling con-
sideration in a sophisticated appraisal of the potential liability of a firm for sales
activity challenged as predatory pricing. Accordingly, the cost concept is the first
topic discussed in Part I.'
The cost concept discussion is followed by a comparison of the other elements
and significant features of the prohibitions in the applicable federal statutes and the
UPA. 24 A discussion of the treatment of "loss leader" pricing under the federal
statutes and the UPA is next,25 and the Article concludes with a general summary and
comparison of the federal and California statutes discussed in this Article.
15. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (West 1973) (the best known provision of the RPA-amended
sections of the Clayton Act).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221. Brooke Group leaves the measure of "cost" undetermined. At one
time the predatory price concept under the RPA apparently did not require that the defendant's price be below any
measure of cost. See infra text accompanying note 27 (discussing Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115
(1954)).
18. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1987).
19. Id. § 17071 (West 1987).
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See infra Part LB.
22. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing the concepts of average, total, variable, and
marginal costs).
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part m.
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I. THE DuFTERENT COST CONCEPTS
A. Introduction
The prohibitions contained in the antitrust laws are, for the most part, broad
proscriptions of essentially undefined, but pejoratively stated, conduct.26 During the
period of the Warren Court (1953-1969), these prohibitions generally received
expansive interpretations, and in keeping with the general tendency, the Court held
that low price selling in one market by a multi-market seller could be prohibited by
section 2(a) of the RPA, without regard to whether the seller sold below its cost,
when it discriminated in the selling price for a favored buyer.27
By 1980, the era of expansive application of the antitrust acts by federal courts
had ended.2 Since that year, the United States Supreme Court has consistently scaled
back the reach of provisions in those acts that apply to below cost pricing. 29 As will
be seen, the most recent opinion of the Court on the issue of the measure of cost in
predatory pricing reflects this dominant trend in contemporary federal antitrust law.3°
The UPA, in contrast to the federal antitrust statutes, is precisely drawn to
eliminate defined commercial practices such as predatory pricing. Therefore, chan-
ging judicial perspectives on antitrust enforcement have far less influence on the
development of California predatory pricing law than on the development of the
federal counterparts. Accordingly, there has been no indication by California courts
that the application of the UPA will be limited by judicial interpretation.31 In fact,
California courts have shown an increasing readiness to apply the UPA prohibitions
in complex and arguably ambiguous situations.
32
26. For example, the Sherman Act, in sections 1 and 2, respectively, condemns "contract(s) ... in restraint
of trade" and firms that "monopolize" markets. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 (West 1994). Also note that section 7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits mergers that produce an effect that may substantially "lessen competition" in any market.
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1996).
27. See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954); see also Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685,702-03 (1967) (holding that three discriminating sellers could be in violation of section
2(a) of the RPA without proof that the low prices they charged favored buyers were below cost, as long as the low-
priced sales made a competitor lose sales and retire from the market).
28. The two Supreme Court opinions that are generally recognized as indicating the Court's change from
an expansive interpretation are United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) and Continental .V.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
29. See Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990) (interpreting the RPA); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-91 (1986) (discussing "predatory pricing"); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (interpreting section 2 of the Sherman Act); Truett-Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981) (limiting available damages under the RPA).
30. See infra notes 43,58-59,77-78 and accompanying text (discussing Brooke Group).
31. See, e.g., G.H.LI. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 256,271, 195 Cal. Rptr. 211,220(1983) (holding it
is proper to expand statutory treble damage liability for secret rebate violations to buyers who receive them because
UPA provisions are to be construed liberally).
32. More recent opinions show an expansive attitude toward California Business and Professions Code §
17043. See Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811,824-25, 268 Cal. Rptr. 856, 863-64
(1990) (upholding § 17043 and the use of a "fully allocated cost" under the section against the claim that each was
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The UPA is precise in its definition of "cost 33 for the purpose of determining
whether a seller is selling below cost. More importantly, the Act specifies that the
measure of cost is the measure that produces the highest possible figure for the vital
comparison between seller price and seller cost.34 This makes it significantly easier
for the plaintiff to prevail in an action. To explain why this is so requires the
following review of the different measures of cost that could be used to determine
a seller's cost.
What the layperson thinks of as the "cost" of producing a product is essentially
what an economist would call the "total cost" of producing the item, meaning all
costs incurred to produce the item including labor, materials, overhead, or any other
type of cost.35 To determine the average total cost of producing a product, the total
of all costs incurred in the production process is divided by the "output," or total
number of units of the product produced. Laypersons probably would refer to this
figure as the "average cost," while the economist's term is "average total cost."
The total cost of production of a product is the sum of two distinct types of costs:
fixed costs and variable costs. 36 Fixed costs are those that do not vary with output and
typically include management expenses, depreciation, property costs, and other
irreducible outlays. Average fixed cost is the sum of all fixed costs divided by output.
Variable costs, on the other hand, vary with the amount of output and include
outlays for materials and labor. Average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs
divided by output. Average fixed cost plus average variable cost equals the average
total cost of producing (or distributing) a product.
preempted by federal law); E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros., 158 Cal. App. 3d 728, 733-38, 204 Cal. Rptr.
838, 841-45 (1984) (holding that a prima facie case under § 17043 was made out by proof of a sale below cost and
a diversion of business to defendant from competitor); Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Med. Enters., Inc.,
42 Cal. App. 3d 496, 502-04, 117 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47-49 (1974) (holding that § 17043 is applicable to individual
portions of a contract and indicating broad coverage of the section to include leases of real property).
The expansive interpretations in recent opinions noted in the preceding paragraph represent a change from
the somewhat grudging attitude the state appellate courts took toward the section, as found in earlier state appellate
court opinions. See Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 207, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882 (1965) (holding that
no intent to injure competitors was proven); Independent Journal Newspapers v. United W. Newspapers, Inc., 15
Cal. App. 3d 583, 586, 93 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1971) (requiring a highly specific pleading of facts showing below
cost sales).
33. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 1987) (clarifying that "cost" refers to production costs,
such as "the cost of raw materials, labor, and distribution costs, such as the invoice or replacement cost.., plus
the cost of doing business); id. § 17029 (West 1987) (defining "cost" as "all costs of doing business incurred in the
conduct of the business and shall include without limitation the following items of expense: labor (including salaries
of executives and officers), rent, interest on borrowed capital, depreciation, selling cost, maintenance of equipment,
delivery costs, credit losses, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising").
34. Id. § 17026 (West 1987); see infra Part I.C.
35. For convenience in the following discussions of price theory costs, "producing" will include distributing
and "producer" will include wholesalers and retailers as well as manufacturers, and the term "produce" will include
the purchasing and resale activity of wholesalers and retailers.
36. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Rsv. 697,700 (1975).
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Economists recognize an additional cost concept that is generally beyond the
frame of reference of laypersons, the idea of "marginal cost." Marginal cost is the
addition to total cost that will be incurred if and only if an additional unit of output
is produced and sold by a manufacturing firm. 37 Because producers seldom think in
terms of producing only one additional unit,31 marginal cost is almost an entirely
theoretical concept. The actual marginal cost is also extremely hard to determine for
the majority of producers.
Anticipating the result of the discussion to follow, the UPA adopts the average
total cost of the seller as the crucial measure of "cost."39 The measure of seller cost
in the federal law of predatory pricing is less certain, but it appears from the latest
decision of the United States Supreme Court addressing this issue that average
variable cost is the mandated measure of cost.40 The position of the Ninth Circuit on
the issue is quite ambiguous and apparently can be clarified only by a definitive
direction from the Supreme Court.41
B. The Federal Antitrust Law Concept
The recent Supreme Court opinion in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.42 holds that the measure of cost for predatory price litigation under
the RPA will be the same as the measure of cost for predatory price litigation under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.43 Initially suggested in an influential law review article
by Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner,4 the Ninth Circuit adopted the
view that the cost concepts under the two statutes were the same nineteen years ago. 45
The Areeda and Turner article also played a significant role in changing the view
of antitrust courts toward the subject of predatory pricing. Before their article
appeared in 1975, the general judicial view of predatory pricing was that it occurred
37. In the case of wholesale or retail firms, "marginal cost" is the addition to total cost incurred if and only
if an additional unit of product is purchased and resold.
38. Note that a contractor who contracts to build a single home for a customer is one of the few types of
producers in lay experience who calculate the marginal cost of the product and set a price in excess of it in a
conventional home-building contract.
39. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases).
42. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
43. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23.
44. Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 727.
45. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that "section
2 of the Sherman Act ... and section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson Patman Act... are
directed at the same economic evil and have the same substantive content"); see also William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. lIT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1041 (9th Cir. 1981). In Inglis, the court stated that the cost test
for section 2 of the Sherman Act violations was "equally applicable" to primary-line RPA cases, and reiterated that
the court had "previously recognized that where 'a price differential threatens a primary line injury... [the two
statutes] are directed at the same economic evil."' William Inglis & Sons Baking, 668 F.2d at 1041 (quoting Janich
Bros., 570 F.2d at 855).
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frequently, was an effective device for obtaining market monopolies, and could be
prohibited without adversely affecting markets or price levels. 46 Areeda and Turnel
challenged all three assumptions,47 and within a decade the United States Supreme
Court adopted their views.48
Areeda and Turner focused on the crucial importance of low prices and price
cutting in free market competition.49 To avoid needless over-deterrence of price
cutting, Areeda and Turner advocated a cost-based test for detecting actionable pre-
datory pricing that would eliminate what had proven to be the often futile search for
"predatory intent."'5 The authors proposed that the seller's average variable cost5'
for the goods sold in the suspect sale should be the test for predation.5" Applying that
test, a price above average variable cost would be conclusively presumed to be non-
predatory and a price below average variable cost would be conclusively presumed
to be predatory.5" The thinking of the authors was that fixed costs are irrelevant to a
seller's pricing decision because the seller has no ability to avoid those costs. Thus,
selling at any price above the total of the avoidable costs divided by the number of
units produced (which is known as "average variable cost") was rational, meaning
46. See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 52-53 (Ist Cir. 1964); see also 16B JULIANO . VON
KALwOWSKI, BUSiNEss ORGANIZATIONS: ANTrITRUST LAWs AND TRADE REGULATION § 10.01 [2], at 10-4 (1996)
("The traditional model of predatory pricing ... which resulted in a number of verdicts against large businesses was
that a dominant firm in a particular market could cut prices ... while relying on 'deep pocket' resources ... [and
then] raise prices to a monopoly level."). Judge Robert H. Bork acknowledged the perceived view of predation by
stating that "[t]here was a time not so long ago when everybody knew that the great American trusts had established
and maintained monopoly positions by the ruthless extermination of smaller rivals" ROBERT BORK, THE ANTrnUsT
PARADOX 145 (1978). Julian von Kalinowski also acknowledged the "traditional formulation of the efficacy of
predatory pricing as a tool for monopolization." VON KALINOWSKI, supra, at 10-4. The early case law showed the
willingness of courts to find predation. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70-77 (1911);
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Areeda and Turner criticized the "exaggerated fears that large firms will be inclined to engage in [predatory
pricing]." Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 698; see infra note 47. The efficacy of the practice was also
questioned in Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268
(1981) ("The predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off.").
47. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 699 (questioning the frequency of predatory pricing violations);
id. at 698-99 (challenging the effectiveness of predatory pricing because satisfying the two prerequisites is
unlikely); id. at 699 (cautioning that extreme care should be taken in formulating predatory pricing rules or else
legitimate competitive pricing may be deterred).
48. See Matsushita Elee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,589 (1986) ("[P]redatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful."); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986). The Court's fear that prohibiting price cutting too broadly would produce the "perverse
result" of inhibiting price competition is further expressed in Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116, and Brooke Group, 509 U.S.
at 220-27.
49. Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 710-11.
50. The article was an attempt to formulate a clear test that courts could use to distinguish between predatory
and competitive pricing because "[clourts in predatory pricing cases have generally turned to such empty formulae
as... predatory intent in adjudicating liability... [which] provide little, if any, basis for analyzing the predatory
pricing offense." Id. at 699.
51. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of average variable cost).
52. Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 716-18.
53. rd. at 711-12.
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that the seller would gain added revenue in the short run. These low, but above
average, variable cost prices would also benefit consumers, as lower prices almost
always do.
With its 1986 opinion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,55 the United States Supreme Court adopted the general premises and analysis
of predatory pricing developed by Areeda and Turner5 6 The Court subsequently
repeated those views in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 57 and Brooke
Group58 However, the Court repeatedly has declined to adopt the average variable
cost standard advocated by Areeda and Turner because it was unnecessary to do so
to decide the cases at bar.59
While the law, of predatory pricing in the Ninth Circuit prior to the Areeda and
Turner article was ambiguous,6 that court readily adopted the views in that article
shortly after its publication. 61 On the crucial issue of the measurement of cost, the
court's opinion, in Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.,62 went further than Areeda and Turner
and adopted a cost-based test for predation that allowed greater freedom to sellers in
pricing products for sale. The Hanson court held that, generally, there was a con-
clusive presumption that any price above average variable cost was nonpredatory,
while there was only a rebuttable presumption that prices below average variable cost
54. Id. at 711. Of course, eventually the seller must realize enough revenues from its sales to pay the fixed
costs as well. Id. at 700. The authors acknowledged that "marginal costs," which are discussed in notes 36-37,
supra, would be a more accurate standard of costs to use for their test. Id. at 701-02. The difficulty of measuring
marginal costs, however, led the authors to advocate average variable costs as an acceptable surrogate measure for
determining if a price was predatory. Id. at 712 n.37.
55. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
56. See Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 588-90.
57. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
58. See infra notes 58-59, 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing Brooke Group).
59. In Brooke Group, the parties stipulated that average variable cost would be the applicable standard for
determining predation. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 n.l. In Matsushita, the Court declined to resolve the cost-
standard issue. The Court said that because Matsushita was a Sherman Act section I case, it was "enough to note"
that an injury resulting from conspiracy occurred due to "pricing below some appropriate measure of cost."
Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 584-85 n.8 & n.9. In Cargill, the Court said the general definition of predatory
pricing as "pricing below cost" was "sufficient" for their purposes, since "only below-cost pricing would threaten
to drive [the plaintiff] from the market... and because [the plaintiff] made no allegation that [the defendant] would
act with predatory intent." Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 117-18 n.12.
60. See Janich Bros., 570 F.2d at 856 ("[O]ur court has been less than clear in formulating a succinct,
definitive test to determine predatory pricing."). It appears there were no previous Ninth Circuit opinions that dealt
specifically with the predatory pricing standard.
61. See Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that there must be
proof of Areeda and Tumer's "below average variable cost" test in order to demonstrate predation); see also id. at
1358 n.5 (citing Areeda and Tumer's view that it is questionable whether or not pricing below a profit maximizing
point above marginal and average variable costs should be predatory).
62. See id. at 1358 (rejecting the plaintiff's allegation that Shell's pricing policy was part of an attempt to
monopolize by affirming a judgment for Shell Oil).
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were.63 Thus, the Hanson court would always allow a defendant seller to rebut the
presumption by proving it had a legitimate business motive for selling at a below
average variable cost price.64 A year after the Hanson opinion, the court specifically
used the average variable cost standard to uphold a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant when the plaintiff failed to produce adequate evidence establishing the
average variable cost of the defendant.!
Following its apparent adoption of the Areeda and Turner position, the Ninth
Circuit retreated from this position to authorize the admission of evidence of pre-
datory intent that was not based on a comparison of the defendant's price to its costs
("noncomparison evidence") in certain situations. The William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.'6 opinion held that a price above the defendant
seller's average variable cost could be proven to be predatory on the basis of non-
comparison evidence.67 The court specifically limited this rule to situations in which
the defendant's above average variable cost price was below its average total cost,68
and the plaintiff was given the burden of persuading the jury that the defendant was
motivated by predatory intent.69 This burden could be discharged by "demonstrating
that the anticipated benefits of defendant's pricing were dependent upon its tendency
to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance.., the benefits of mono-
poly power, ' a practice commonly referred to as "limit pricing."
The William Inglis & Sons Baking court took no position on whether noncompar-
ison evidence was admissible to prove predation if the defendant's price equaled or
exceeded its average total costs.71 On another predation issue, the opinion contained
63. id. A rebuttable presumption is implied by the court's language which states that "[t]hcre may be
nonpredatory and acceptable business reasons for a firm engaging in such [below average variable cost] pricing."
Id. at 1359 n.6.
64. Id. The court explained that pricing below average variable cost was not per se predatory, but rather a
necessary element for a prima facie showing of an intent to monopolize. However, the court did not list any
acceptable nonpredatory business reasons that could be used to defeat the claim.
65. Janich Bros., 570 F.2d at 858-59. The opinion indicated a readiness to adopt the position that no price
above average variable cost could be held to be predatory. Id.
66. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. William Inglis & Sons Baking, 668 F.2d at 1035-36, 1038-39.
68. Id. at 1035-36.
69. Id. Note that Areeda and Turner had denigrated the concept of predatory intent, labeling it one of a
number of "empty formulae." See Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 699.
70. William Inglis & Sons Baking, 663 F.2d at 1038-39; see id. (noting also that the noncomparison evidence
must be examined as a whole and that the evidence of predatory intent introduced at the trial below was
inconclusive). The noncomparison evidence offered by the plaintiff included: a report by a management consulting
firm commissioned by defendant Continental that recommended competitive strategies, semi-annual sales reports
prepared by Continental account executives, and documentary evidence that Continental personnel in northern
California sought "market dominance." Id. at 1038-39. This evidence did not tend to prove predatory intent in the
opinion of the Inglis court. Id.
71. Id. at 1035 n.30 ("We express no opinion on the permissibility of [a claim of predation in price above
average total cost situations].").
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dicta stating that proof that the defendant's price was below average variable cost
would produce only a rebuttable presumption of price predation.
7 2
The subject of predation and above average total cost pricing was reconsidered
by the Ninth Circuit two years later in Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp.73
There, the court squarely held that above average total cost pricing by a defendant
could be predatory. 74 The court offered evidence of limit pricing as a general example
of noncomparison evidence that would be admissible. A firm engaging in limit
pricing charges a price lower than competition would force it to, thereby forgoing
revenues in order to either restrict the sales of existing market competitors or send
a false signal to potential market entrants indicating low profitability in the market.75
The view of predatory pricing taken by the Transamerica Computer court was appar-
ently premised on the traditional assumptions that predatory pricing was common,
efficient, and could be broadly prohibited without harm to the competitive process.
Three years after Transamerica Computer, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Matsushita Electric Industrial which expressly rejected those assumptions.76
At present, the run of United States Supreme Court opinions beginning with Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial and ending with Brooke Group makes the Transamerica
Computer position on predation and above average total cost pricing untenable
7
As the law in the Ninth Circuit now stands, if the defendant seller's prices are
above average total cost, no price predation can be found.78 If the defendant's prices
72. IL at 1036. However, the court stated that it is unlikely that pricing below average variable cost will be
legitimate since the firm will be incurring out of pocket losses on each unit sold. Id. at 1035. Compare id. with
Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 733 (asserting that proof of below average variable cost pricing establishes a
conclusive presumption of unlawful predatory pricing).
73. 698 F.2d 1377, 1386(9th Cir. 1983).
74. Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1386-88. The Transamerica court stated, "The logic of the Inglis
approach applies with equal force in evaluating prices above average total cost." Id. at 1388. The opinion holds that
the plaintiffs evidence of noncomparison evidence of predatory intent would have to be "clear and convincing"
to support ajury finding of predation. Id.
75. The Transamerica Computer court presented three reasons for its hesitation to declare prices above
average total cost as legal per se. First, limit pricing could occur at above average total cost. Id. at 1387. Second,
it was "unwise" to base conclusions solely on a. price/cost analysis, since "uncertainty and imprecision" are
"inherent in determining 'costs."' Id. Finally, a rule that prices above average total cost are presumed legal would
create a "free zone" in which monopolists could "exploit their power without fear of scrutiny by the law." Id.
"Limit pricing" was defined as a situation "in which a monopolist sets prices above average total cost but
below the short-term profit-maximizing level so as to discourage new entrants and thereby maximize profits over
the long run." Id. at 1387 (citing 3 PHt.Lp AREEDA & DONALD TuRNER, ANTrrRusT LAw I 714b (1978)). The
court cited California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743 (9th Cir. 1979), as support for the
principle that limit pricing could be held predatory. Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1387, 1389 n.19.
76. See supra notes 56, 59 and accompanying text (discussing Matsushita Electric Industrial).
77. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223-24. The Court in Brooke Group clearly reaffirms the Areeda and
Turner view. Id. The opinion states that only prices below some appropriate measure of cost can be held predatory.
Id. at 224-26. Because the highest appropriate measure of costs is average total cost, no price over it could be
considered predatory after Brooke Group.
78. Although the post-Transamerica Computer test for cost in the Ninth Circuit recognized a cause of action
based on prices above average total cost, Brooke Group forecloses a predatory pricing claim based on prices above
average total cost. Acknowledging that the Matsushita Electric Industrial and Cargill opinions "suggest that only
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are between average variable cost and average total cost, price predation can be
found if the plaintiff meets the burden of proving, through noncomparison evidence,
that the defendant was motivated by predatory intent.79 However, the concept of non-
comparison evidence that proves predatory intent remains vague!' Finally, if the
defendant's price is below average variable cost, the defendant will be held to have
engaged in predatory pricing unless the defendant can persuade the jury that the
defendant did not intend to eliminate competitors and obtain a monopoly.8'
There are a number of subsequent Ninth Circuit opinions developing important
points for the application of the above noted main principles. These opinions con-
sider the proper calculation of average variable cost and what type of noncomparison
evidence should be admitted to prove predation.
In three decisions handed down since Transamerica, the Ninth Circuit has set out
an additional requirement for designating a cost as "variable" and includable in the
calculation of a defendant seller's average variable cost. Starting with Marsann Co.
v. Brammall, Inc.82 in 1986, the court stated that only "unique costs" incurred speci-
fically in relation to the production and distribution of the identified added units of
a defendant's output can be included in the defendant's total variable cost.83 This
restrictive concept is much narrower than the traditional definition of variable costs,
which includes all costs incurred only because the seller chose to make and distribute
more than one unit of the particular product involved in the sales at issue.'
below-cost prices should suffice" as a basis for a predatory pricing cause of action, the Court in Brooke Group
effectively overrules decisions holding above average total cost prices predatory. See id. at 233.
79. See William Inglis & Sons Baking, 668 F.2d at 1035-36.
80. See supra text notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
81. See William Inglis & Sons Baking, 668 F.2d at 1038-39.
82. 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986).
83. Marsann, 788 F.2d at 612-14. In Marsann, the defendant sold the service of straightening large rolls
of such materials as paper, steel, and tin steel so that the materials could be used in manufacturing processes.
Processors hired the defendant to use its equipment and expertise to straighten malfunctioning rolls of these
materials.
The majority of the Marsann court held that expenses incurred to generally increase defendant's output of
services could not be included in the total variable costs of the defendant. The majority's rationale was that under
applicable precedent, only the sales at issue constituted the "product." Thus, only costs specifically incurred to
produce and distribute the specific services that had allegedly been sold below cost (i.e., the "product") could be
included in a computation of variable costs. Id. at 614-15. This requirement that all variable cost must be "unique"
to, or "uniquely incurred" for, the sales at issue has been criticized. David L. Siddall, Comment, Antitrust Laiv-
Predatory Pricing: A Ninth Circuit Wrinkle: Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 12 J. CORP. L. 765,776-80 (1987).
In an insightful concurring opinion, Judge Choy maintained that the majority's definition of product was
incorrect. He pointed out that variable costs generally include any type of cost, the total of which varies with
defendant's level of output of the service, not just the specific amount of costs uniquely incurred in making the sales
at issue. Marsann, 788 F.2d at 615-16. According to Judge Choy, when a prima facie case of predation has been
established, any argument for adjusting the average variable cost figure for sales made to a particular customer
constitutes an affirmative defense. As such, it is the defendant's burden to prove which costs were unnecessary to
the output of goods or services for that customer. Otherwise, Judge Choy asserts, an unreasonable burden is placed
on a plaintiff attempting to prove predatory pricing since noncomparison evidence is "rarely available." Id. at 617.
84. After the first unit is made, the total amount of variable costs will vary with the level of the producer's
output.
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Under the "unique cost" concept, expenses generally incurred in supplying the
product that cannot be specifically earmarked as incurred to make the particular sale
are excluded from variable costs." Thus, "heating, telephone, supervisors, display
space,... and supplies" not shown to have been necessary solely for the production,
as well as the distribution, of the specific output sold in the allegedly predatory price
sale have been excluded from variable costs by the Ninth Circuit.86 In all but a few
cases the unique cost requirement for variable cost computation will "reduce the
average variable cost figure so low that the price of the sale at issue will exceed it.
This means that in the Ninth Circuit few, if any, predatory price sales will be found
on the basis of price-cost comparison evidence.
While the Ninth Circuit has addressed the subject of what noncomparison
evidence will support a finding of predatory pricing when the defendant's price was
above average variable cost,87 noncomparison evidence proving predatory intent has
never been admitted as evidence in a reported case. The discussion to follow assumes
that there is still 'viability to the Ninth Circuit rule that pricing can be predatory even
when the price at issue exceeds average variable cost. This is a weak assumption
given the United States Supreme Court's views announced, most recently, in Brooke
Group. However, the noncomparison evidence concept will continue to be important
because in cases where the price of the sale at issue is below average variable cost,
noncomparison evidence will be relevant on the issue of predatory intent!
8
Two Ninth Circuit opinions have discussed limit pricing as noncomparison
evidence. In Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp.,89 the court restated the idea that if
the proof showed defendant's price was above its average variable cost, predation
could still be proven, but "it is the plaintiffs burden to prove that the defendant
'sacrificed greater profits or incurred greater losses than necessary in order to
eliminate the plaintiff." '9° In Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc.,9t the court followed Zoslaw
and William Inglis & Sons Baking, quoting the same phrase to endorse the idea that
a defendant's above average cost price could be proven to be predatory by proof that
the defendant sacrificed revenues in order to destroy or deter a competitor.92 Other
85. Id. at 612.
86. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. Continental Baking Co. Inc., 942 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.
1991); see also Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., No. CV-91-2862-LGB(JRX), 1994 WL 746072, at *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 1994) (discussing and applying the "uniquely incurred" concept).
87. It should be recalled that only prices below average total cost can be illegal. Therefore, the topic of
noncomparison evidence to prove predatory intent is only relevant in tases in which the defendant has charged a
price above average variable cost and below average total cost.
88. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing William Inglis & Sons Baking). Of course,
as long as the unique cost concept remains part of the Ninth Circuit concept of average variable cost, there will be
few cases in which the defendant's price is below its average variable cost.
89. 693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982).
90. Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 888 (quoting William Inglis & Sons Baking, 668 F.2d at 1036).
91. 742F.2d 1184(9th Cir. 1984).
92. Ainveld, 742 F.2d at 1193.
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opinions have noted the possibility of self-incriminating memos as relevant evidence
of predatory intent.93
The uncertainty of the idea of "intent" in the predatory pricing context continues
to be a central problem. Finns set prices to win sales from competitors, and the
question of whether elimination of one or more of those competitors is an unforeseen
result or a primary motive will always be difficult. Areeda and Turner argued against
consideration of noncomparison evidence on the issue of predatory intent because of
this uncertainty, 94 and many courts have expressed sympathy with their view.95 The
vague concept of noncomparison evidence, the uniquely incurred cost requirement,
and the seeming incompatibility between Ninth Circuit opinions such as William
Inglis & Sons Baking and Transamerica Computer and the strong dicta in Brooke
Group make predatory pricing law in the Ninth Circuit problematic, at best.
C. The UPA Cost Concept
As stated at the beginning of this Article, the major difference between the
federal predatory price concept and that contained in the UPA is the different mea-
surements of cost under the statutes.9 6 The UPA cost measure, which is clearly set
forth in a comprehensive statute, employs a "fully allocated cost" measure to deter-
mine a seller's cost for the crucial price-cost comparison.97 This measure is the same
as the economist's term "average total cost," and it includes a reasonably allocated
portion of fixed costs into the measurement of average costs. The UPA expressly
includes either allocations of "overhead expense" or "cost of doing business" in the
defendant's cost.98 Those terms expressly include: "labor (including salaries of
executives and officers), rent, interest on borrowed capital, depreciation, selling
costs, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, credit losses, all types of licenses,
taxes, insurance and advertising."
93. See Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1385 n.8 (citing Lawrence Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1229-30, 1232
(1977)); see also Marsann, 788 F.2d at 617 (Choy, J., concurring).
94. Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 699.
95. See, e.g., Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 890-91 (5th Cir.
1984); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981). In these opinions and
in the many opinions cited in them, the courts' sympathy for the Areeda and Turner view does not compel the
opinion to adopt the strict cost-price comparison standards of those authors.
96. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 1987). Section 17026 gives the following cost formulas: for
production (manufacturers or producers), cost = raw material costs + labor costs + "all overhead expenses"; for
distribution (wholesalers or retailers), cost = either invoice or replacement cost, whichever is lower + "cost of doing
business," or a 6% markup if cost of doing business is indeterminable.
98. Id § 17029 (West 1987). "Overhead expense" refers to allocated fixed costs of a manufacturer and "cost
of doing business" refers to the allocated fixed costs of a distributor. See id.
99. Id.; see id. (including the terms quoted above in the text "without limitation").
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The UPA does not set out a method for determining the allocation of overhead
expense. To be legally acceptable, however, the allocation of overhead to a given
product or distribution activity must be reasonably related to the burden that product
or activity imposes on the overall cost of doing business. 1°° A defendant may refute
below cost pricing charges by demonstrating that its own reasonable cost methods
show the prices were actually above cost.'0 1 The fully allocated cost method will
make the crucial cost figure significantly higher under the UPA than will the variable
cost figure used under the federal statutes.lre The difference will be extreme in the
Ninth Circuit which follows the "uniquely incurred" cost concept. 103 Therefore, low-
price selling permitted under Ninth Circuit federal predatory price prohibitions may
well be prohibited by the UPA.
In Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transportation, Inc.,1' 4 the court held that the
cost formula employed by the UPA does not conflict with the standard used in
applying the federal antitrust laws and is not preempted by those laws.'05 The cost
measure in the UPA simply sets a different standard than that used for federal
statutes, and the fully allocated cost formula is reasonably related to legislative intent
to prevent monopolies. Specifically, the UPA cost measure prevents multi-product
companies from allocating all overhead expenses away from one product to others,
charging very low prices for that product, and thereby forcing all smaller, single-
product competitors out of the marketY
°6
In UPA litigation, a plaintiff has the benefit of several provisions of the Act that
offer assistance in proving the defendant's costs. The most straightforward proof a
plaintiff could produce would be testimony from a certified public accountant who
had examined the defendant's books and calculated the overhead using the generally
accepted accounting principles agreed upon by the profession.' 7 If actual overhead
cost information is unobtainable, California Business and Professions Code § 17072
100. Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811, 822, 268 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1990).
Allocation of out-of-state advertising expenses was an issue in Western Union Fin. Svcs., Inc. v. First Data Corp.,
20 Cal. App. 4th 1530, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993). In that case, Western Union sued its competitor for UPA
violations, alleging below-cost sales of money transfer services within California. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's cost analysis, which excluded advertising costs incurred outside California from the allocated overhead
cost figure for California sales. Id. at 1539, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
101. Turnbull & Turnbull, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 823,268 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
102. See supra notes 48-60, 99-101 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
104. Turnbull & Turnbull, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
105. Id. at 823-26,268 Cal. Rptr. at 862-65. The decision specifically involved the Sherman Act, but there
is no difference between that statute and the RPA for the purpose of determining a state law/federal law conflict.
106. Id. at 822,268 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
107. The discovery sections of the UPA and the liberal general California discovery statutes provide for the
discovery of defendant's books for this purpose. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17083, 17084 (West 1987); CAL.
Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 2016-2036.5 (West Supp. 1996); see, e.g., Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 204,
404 P.2d 486, 488, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878, 886 (1965) (appointing a certified public accountant to examine the
defendant's books after a stipulation by the parties).
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allows the use of cost surveys for the defendant's vicinity as evidence in proving
cost.108
Four methods for proving that the defendant's contract price for providing bus
services for handicapped children were below cost were noted in Turnbull &
Turnbull.'"An economist, specializing in the transportation industry, testified for the
plaintiff to establish that under each of the following computations the defendant's
bid price was below its contract price: (1) A comparison of the defendant's net
revenue in the location where the alleged below cost pricing took place with the
defendant's net revenue from other locations, (2) a comparison of revenues per mile
between defendant's contracts within the same county, (3) a comparison between a
recomputation of defendant's costs based upon national surveys of bus operations
cost data and the defendant's bid price, and (4) a comparison between a total expense
figure for defendant's services based upon a reallocation of defendant's cost figures
and its bid price. All four methods were apparently valid to the appellate court which
said that in order for the allocation of overhead costs to a particular product or
service to be "legally acceptable," the allocation "must be reasonably related to the
burden such product or service imposes on the overall cost of doing business.""t 0 A
defendant is free to challenge the plaintiff's computation with its own overhead cost
allocation by "using another reasonable allocation method." ''
The UPA also provides that discounts the defendant actually received for prompt
payment of debts cannot be taken into account in computing the defendant's cost."'
Volume purchase discounts, called "trade discounts," have been distinguished from
prompt payment discounts by court interpretation."' Volume discounts are con-
sidered reductions in the sales price, and must be reflected in any computation of the
defendant seller's cost.11
4
Several other UPA provisions assist the plaintiff in proving the defendant's cost.
California Business and Professions Code § 17074 provides that proof of transpor-
tation tariffs are presumptive evidence of delivery costs;"t5 § 17076 requires that the
prevailing wage rate be used to compute the defendant seller's labor cost, even if the
defendant pays its employees less than the prevailing wage; 1 6 and § 17077 provides
that if raw materials were obtained for nonmonetary consideration not easily valued,
108. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17072 (West 1987) (establishing that a "cost survey for the locality and
vicinity" is competent evidence to prove defendant's costs). But see Johnson v. Farmer, 41 Cal. App. 2d 874, 878-
79, 107 P.2d 959, 961-62 (1940) (rejecting a cost survey because it had no relevance to defendant's situation and
costs); McCarthy, supra note 10, at 178 (discussing how cost is proven).
109. Turnbull & Tunrbull, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 816,268 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
110. Id. at 822, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
111. Id. at 823, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
112. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 1987). One interesting statutory exception is discounts given
by cigarette manufacturers, if offered on a general basis. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17026.5 (Vest 1987).
113. See United States v. California Portland Cement Co., 413 F.2d 161, 172-74 (9th Cir. 1969).
114. See E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros., 158 Cal. App. 3d 728,734,204 Cal. Rptr. 838, 843 (1984).
115. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 17074 (West 1987).
116. Id. § 17076 (West 1987).
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the prevailing market rates for those raw materials can be used to calculate costs.117
These presumptions shift the burden of producing evidence in many cost issues,
requiring a defendant to produce definitive costs to overcome the statutory pre-
sumptions.
D. Summary
In any litigation in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a sale
below cost, it is a very significant benefit for the plaintiff to have the applicable law
require that the figure for the defendant's cost be high. This is the net effect of the
UPA provisions when compared with the applicable cost concept developed by
federal courts under section 2 of the Sherman Act or section 2(a) of the RPA." 8
Because overhead expense is often a large component of average total cost, the UPA
figure for defendant's cost will often be much higher than the comparable federal
antitrust figure. In the Ninth Circuit the difference between the defendant's cost
figure in a UPA cause of action and the comparable figure in a federal antitrust action
is even greater because the circuit presently follows the "unique cost" concept in
calculating the defendant's Variable costs." 9 The distinct advantage a plaintiff has in
proving a high figure for the defendant's cost in a UPA action, as opposed to a plain-
tiff in a federal antitrust action, is further enhanced because of the various statutory
presumptions contained in the UPA.1
20
I. COMPARISON OF OTHER ASPECTS OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WITH THE
CALIFORNIA UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
A. Federal Statutes
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize" any relevant
market.' 2' To show a violation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged
in strongly disfavored or "tainted" conduct in obtaining or maintaining its market
share and that the defendant has a monopoly share of the relevant market or some-
thing approaching it.' 22 Courts have had a difficult time formulating appropriate
terms for the "conduct element," and the test for this element has been described as
a determination whether the defendant monopolist's conduct or business practices
117. Id. § 17077 (West 1987).
118. See supra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1996).
122. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). Note that the fact
and amount of damage suffered by the plaintiff in a private enforcement action is not part of the proof of a violation.
See infra Part II.B.4. (discussing proof of damages).
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were "exclusionary;"' ' or were "something other than the exercise of skill, industry
or foresight; ' 4 or, in the latest formulation, were "not related to any apparent
efficiency."'1 5 While a lasting statement of the test for the element has yet to appear,
courts have long held that proof of "predatory pricing" by a monopolist satisfies the
conduct element.
t 5
The second element of the offense of monopolization requires proof that the
defendant possesses monopoly power in the particular market in which it engaged
in the particular conduct that is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint. This "power
element" often causes difficulty for the plaintiff seeking to privately enforce section
2 of the Sherman Act because proving or "defining" the relevant market is frequently
a daunting task.127 It can also be difficult to determine the exact amount of total sales
in that market, so that the defendant's share of those sales can be calculated. Under
the UPA there is no power element, and the process of market definition is not a con-
cern. While the UPA requires proof of conduct, that conduct, selling below cost, is
well defined in the Act.128
Under section 2(a) of the RPA, difficulties are caused by the precise demands of
the statute. The plaintiff must prove (1) discrimination by the seller (requiring at least
one sale at favorable terms and at least one sale at unfavorable terms), (2) in com-
pleted sales (as opposed to lease) transactions, (3) involving goods (as opposed to
services, intangibles, or land), (4) in the course of interstate commerce (meaning one
of the sales must involve shipment by the seller over a state line to the buyer), (5)
that produced a certain type of anticompetitive effect. 129 The predatory price concept
has been important under section 2 of the RPA only because federal courts have held
that if predatory price selling occurs, the final anticompetitive effect element of a
cause of action under section 2(a) may be established.130 None of the first four
123. United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954). Judge Wyzanski relied upon the opinion in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948),
overruled in part by Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), as support for the term.
It is a fair extrapolation from Justice Douglas's opinion in Griffith. However, that opinion does not use the precise
adjective. See Griffith, 334 U.S. at 106-10.
124. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d at 430. The famous opinion by Judge Learned Hand discussed the
conduct element at length. Id. at 429-32.
125. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 n.39 (1985); see infra notes 126-
93 and accompanying text (discussing the conduct element of the monopolization offense). The conduct element
of the attempt to monopolize offense has proven to be even more elusive. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506
U.S. 447,454-59 (1993).
126. See supra Part LB. (discussing the cost concept in the predatory pricing context of section 2 of the
Sherman Act); see also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-83 (1911) (discussing the
concept of predatory pricing as an act of monopolization); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911)
(discussing how predatory pricing can be an act of monopolization).
127. See Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d at 423-27 (describing the importance and difficulty of a market
definition under a monopolization charge).
128. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
129. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (vest 1994).
130. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954).
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requirements of section 2(a) of the RPA are found in the UPA. The fifth requirement
of anticompetitive effect, while an issue in many UPA cases, has been made rather
easy for a plaintiff to satisfy because of court interpretations of the Act.'3 ' Other
facets of the law of section 2(a) of the RPA and of section 2 of the Sherman Act that
can affect private enforcement actions are discussed in subpart II.B.
B. The UPA
1. Basic Prohibition and Procedural Concerns
California Business and Professions Code § 17043133 prohibits "any person
engaged in business within" the State of California from selling or giving away any
article or product at less than cost 34 for the purpose of injuring competitors or
131. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Part II.B.2. (discussing injurious intent); see also infra Part ILB.3. (discussing affirmative
defenses); infra Part II.B.4. (discussing damages).
133. CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1987).
134. There is presently a possible conflict over whether the sale below cost must occur within the state of
California. Both present case law and present policy indicate that an in-state sale is required, but the issue is not
foreclosed at this time.
In Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal. App. 3d 137, 145, 248 Cal. Rptr. 276, 280 (1988), the court was concerned
with whether California Business and Professions Code § 17043, of the UPA, was preempted by the Sherman Act
in connection with a transaction that involved foreign commerce. Id. at 145-50, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 280-84. Although
a sale to a government agency of the Republic of Korea was involved, the court did not address the issue of whether
the allegedly below cost sale took place outside California. The opinion holds there was no preemption. Id. at 146,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 281. Since the delivery of rice, the product involved, would be outside the state, it could be argued
that the opinion is consistent with the view that § 17043 is applicable to sales if the adverse effect of the sale is felt
in California by competitors of the predatory price seller.
More recently, opinions in two federal court cases have held that § 17043 only applies to below cost sales
made in California. Only one of the opinions was officially reported. In Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455,
1456-63 (9th Cir. 1993), the court specifically held that § 17043 prohibits only predatory sales made in California.
The court thereby sustained the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on this holding. Id. at 1464.
Another district court opinion from the Central District of California has also held that the "engaged in business
within this state" phrase requires that title in the sale at issue must pass within California. California Egg Mktg.
Ass'n v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., No. CV 88-1736-RMT(EX), 1991 WL 263533, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1991).
Although there is no clearly ascertainable plain meaning of the language of the statute, the modern view of
antitrust laws as "consumer protection" statutes would compel the position that the sale must take place in a market
in the State of California. This requirement would ensure that only those sales would be protected by the statute
and prevent the breakdown in competition that predatory price selling was thought to invariably produce when §
17043 was enacted. Of course, the UPA was enacted at a time when protection of small retailers and wholesalers
was important to legislative bodies, this being accepted as one of the reasons for the passage of the RPA in 1936.
See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,48-50 (1948). However, the announced purpose of the UPA is to protect
competition. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17001 (West 1987). This statutory purpose has been viewed traditionally
as directly contrary to an intent to protect competitors. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects."). But see Harris v. Capitol
Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 461,413 P.2d 139, 144, 50 Cal. R~ptr. 539, 644 (1966) ("Throughout the
[UPA] the legislature has manifested its intent to discourage practices which injure the seller's competitors ....").
329
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destroying competition.135 The definitional sections of the UPA define "person" as
an individual, partnership, firm, corporation, or any other business entity. " 6 The term
"sell" means an offer or advertising for sale, 137 and "give" means an offer or adver-
tising with intent to give. 13 The term "article or product" means any "thing of value,"
including "service or output of a service trade," except for the output of publicly
owned utilities or companies in industries subject to government price regulation. 139
One court has implied that an interest in real property should be considered a "thing
of value" under the prohibitions of the Act.140 Thus, § 17043 has much greater scope
than section 2(a) of the RPA, which only applies to completed interstate sales of
commodities. 4 ' In addition, the Act contains a specific statutory provision com-
manding that the entire Act be construed liberally so that its beneficial effects can be
achieved 142 and a "catch-all" section that prohibits "any scheme.., or any device of
any nature whereby . . . [a] sale below cost is in substance or fact effected in
violation of the spirit and intent of this [Act]." 43
Causes of action under § 17043 have been maintained in federal courts under the
supplemental jurisdiction concept." Furthermore, a meritorious supplemental state
claim brought in federal court may be tried later in a state court after all the under-
135. See infra Part II.B.2. (discussing the intent to injure competition or destroy competitors requirement,
which is easily presumed under California Business and Professions Code § 17071).
136. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17021 (West 1987).
137. Id. § 17022 (West 1987).
138. Id. § 17023 (West 1987); see id. § 17046 (West 1987) (stating that it is unlawful to effectuate a violation
of the UPA through any threat, intimidation, or boycott).
139. Id. § 17024 (West 1987); see Garner v. Journeyman Barbers' Union, 223 Cal. App. 2d 101, 107-08,
35 Cal. Rptr. 693, 697-98 (1963) (holding that barber services are covered under the UPA); Paramount Gen. Hosp.
Co. v. National Med. Enters., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 496, 503, 117 Cal. Rptr. 42,48 (1974) (holding that under the
UPA lease-service package involving the operation of a hospital was an "article or product").
140. See Paramount Gen. Hosp., 42 Cal. App. 3d at 502 n.9, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 47 n.9 (stating that "there
appears to be no historical reason why... interest[s] in real property of one kind or another are not 'things of
value' ); id at 503 n.10, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 48 n.10 (reserving judgment on whether "pure" lease agreements, which
do not involve services furnished by the lessor, are covered by the UPA).
141. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (West 1994).
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17002 (West 1987).
143. Id. § 17049 (West 1987); see Paramount Gen. Hosp., 42 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47
(relying on the "catch-all" section in holding that the listing of specific types of business practices under
prohibitions of the UPA was merely for illustrative purposes and not to be read to limit the application of the
prohibition); Independent Journal Newspapers v. United W. Newspapers, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 583, 586, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 299, 301 (1971) (interpreting this section to make the UPA applicable to sales below cost that were tied in
with sales above cost).
144. See, e.g., Royal Serv., Inc. v. Goody Prods., Inc., No. C88-2758 TEH, 1988 WL 126556, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 1988); Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 1986); USA Petroleum
Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 (C.D. Cal. 1983). In those cases, the § 17043 claim was
maintained under the "pendent jurisdiction" power of the federal court involved. With the enactment of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 in 1990, the pendent jurisdiction concept was subsumed under the more general "supplemental jurisdiction"
rubric of § 1367. Section 17043 actions will continue to be readily maintainable with federal court predatory price
litigation as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pantazis v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., No. C 94-1094-FMS,
1994 WL 519469, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1994).
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lying federal claims have been dismissed by the federal forum and the case has been
remanded to a state court.
1 45
The usual rules of pleading and practice apply to UPA causes of action,
including the requirement that complaints not be pleaded in vague or conclusory
terms.146 This requirement was taken to a seemingly illogical extreme in a 1971 court
of appeal opinion holding that a complaint in a § 17043 action must state the defen-
dant's sales price and the defendant's cost for the unit sold. 147 A later opinion relaxed
this pleading requirement somewhat, holding that if it is difficult for a plaintiff to
estimate the defendant's cost of doing business, and speculation on the figure is not
useful, a general averment on information and belief in the complaint of defendant's
will be sufficient.
1 48
2. Defendant's Injurious Intent
The concept of intent to injure competition in federal predatory price litigation
has been minimized in importance over the last twenty years. 49 In the UPA, how-
ever, proof that the predatory pricing seller made the offending sales with the intent
"of injuring competitors or destroying competition" continues to be specifically
required.'5s The injurious intent requirement was apparently established to meet the
demands of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
145. See Kirk-Mayer, 626 F. Supp. at 1172-73 (granting summary judgment for defendant on all federal law
claims for violation of the Sherman Act, but dismissing without prejudice the related state claims for violation of
the UPA); see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Dismissal
of [a] federal claim does not deprive a federal court of the power to adjudicate the remaining pendent [now
supplemental] state claims.") (citation omitted).
146. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 323-24, 444 P.2d 481,492-93, 70
Cal. Rptr. 849, 860-61 (1968).
147. Independent Journal Newspapers, 15 Cal. App. 3d at 586-87, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
148. G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 256, 275-76, 195 Cal. Rptr. 211,223-24 (1983).
149. The characterization of "predatory intent" by Areeda and Turner as one of a number of "empty
formulae" in predatory pricing law signaled a major change in the attitude toward intent as a viable concept in the
area. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 36, at 699. They recommended eliminating intent as a matter of judicial
concern because it provided "little, if any, basis for analyzing the predatory pricing offense." Id. A few years later
the Federal Trade Commission proclaimed that "intent is a barren issue without consideration of the means" used
by a low price seller to gain market share. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 727 (1980). A few
years after that, then Judge Stephen G. Breyer wrote, "But 'intent to harm' without more offers too vague a standard
in a world where executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business,' and long-term effects on
consumers depend in large measure on competitors' responses." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724
F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983). The present status of the predatory intent concept is discussed in PHILLIP AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANIrRUST LAW 714.2, at 493-500 (Supp. 1996); see id. I 714.2h, at 500 ("[Olne might
still wonder whether the search for it is generally worth the effort, given that it would seldom be helpful.").
150. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1987).
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Minnesota,5 1 which was effectively overruled sixty years ago. 52 Although the intent
requirement remains in § 17043, it is unimportant as a practical matter.
The UPA assists plaintiffs in § 17043 actions by providing an "injurious intent"
presumption in § 17071.153 Under this section, proof of a sale below cost "together
with proof of the injurious effect of such acts is presumptive evidence of the purpose
or intent to injure competitors or destroy competition."'' " This provision, which was
held constitutional in 1944,155 appears to establish a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of proof in the terms of the modem California Evidence Code. t56 The
effect of such a presumption can be very important because it would entitle a plaintiff
in a § 17043 action to a jury instruction to the effect that the jury must find for the
plaintiff on the intent issue unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that it did not sell below cost with injurious intent.157
The type of evidentiary proof of injurious effect that will support the pre-
sumption of injurious intent was addressed in Sandler v. Gordon5' in 1949. That
151. 274 U.S. 1, 8 (1927), overruled by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see id. (holding that
because a Minnesota law prohibited locality discrimination by dairies in the prices the dairies paid for milk without
regard to the dairies' motives, the statute infringed upon a constitutional right to freely contract in a normally
beneficial way). In Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 658,
82 P.2d 3, 17 (1938), the California Supreme Court found that the UPA required proof of injurious intent, but noted:
"It may be that an absolute prohibition regardless of intent would be unreasonable." Id. at 658, 82 P.2d at 17 (citing
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927)).
152. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934). In Nebbia the Court upheld a state statute fixing
wholesale milk prices, stating: "Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary
and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." Id. at 539. The dissent mentioned and discussed Fairmont
Creamery as one of a number of precedents the Court had, sub silentio, overruled. Id. at 547, 552-53 (McReynolds,
J., dissenting); see McCarthy, supra note 10, at 187 (discussing Fairmont Creamery).
153. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17071 (West 1987). A second injurious intent presumption is established
in California Business and Professions Code § 17071.5. Id. § 17071.5 (West 1987) That section applies to alleged
loss leader sales and is discussed with that topic. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
154. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17071 (%Vest 1987).
155. People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 113-14, 153 P.2d 9, 12-13 (1944).
156. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 605-06 (,Vest 1987). The California Evidence Code became law in 1967, and
no opinion has specifically addressed the question of whether § 17071 creates a presumption affecting the burden
of proof or, the less significant, presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. The test is whether the
presumption at issue "implement[s] some public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular
action." Id. § 605 (West 1987). Section 17071 implements the strong public policy announced in § 17001 of the
California Business and Professions Code to "safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of
monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting... destructive... practices by which fair and
honest competition is destroyed or prevented." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17001 (West 1987). It is thus like the
presumptions held to affect the burden of proof in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693-97, 693 P.2d 261,
300-03, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 721-24 (1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), and William Dal Porto & Sons, Inc. v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 1207-12, 237 Cal. Rptr. 206,212-17 (1987).
157. The text assumes that the plaintiff has offered evidence of the basic facts to establish the § 17071
presumption. Those basic facts are that the defendant made a sale below cost and that the sale diverted business
from the plaintiff. If such evidence is introduced at trial, the judge must instruct the jury that if thejury finds it more
probable than not that the basic facts are true, the jury must decide the intent issue under the instruction described
in the text. CAL EvID. CODE § 606 (West 1987).
158. 94 Cal. App. 2d 254,210 P.2d 314(1949).
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opinion held that evidence proving that identified sales were diverted from the
plaintiff to the defendant was proof of injurious effect and established the injurious
intent presumption. 5 9 Later opinions have held that it is irrelevant whether such
diversion is accomplished by personal solicitation,'tr offers of below cost services
when regular priced items are purchased, 61 secret rebates, 62 or "low-ball" bidding
to secure business at the expense of competitors.'6 If there is proof of a diversion of
traceable sales, injurious effect is established and injurious intent is presumed.164 A
court has also found injurious effect without proof of diversion of traceable sales
when the defendant engaged in pervasive below cost selling. 65 However, in cases of
occasional below cost sales and in cases in which the plaintiff lost only minimal
untraceable sales, no finding of injurious effect can be made.'6
A defendant can rebut the California Business and Professions Code § 17071
presumption of injurious intent by affirmative proof that the below cost pricing was
due to good faith mistakes in the defendant's business operations.' 67 A defendant
who systematically destroyed accounting documents to make it impossible to cal-
culate its costs would not appear to be acting in good faith. 68
159. Sandler, 94 Cal. App. 2d at 255-57, 210 P.2d at 315-17. The defendant took the plaintiff's customer list
from the plaintiff's delivery truck, then diverted business by offering free (below cost) services to obtain these
customers, to the injury of the plaintiff. Although these facts establish the § 17071 presumption, the plaintiff
rebutted the presumption. Id. at 256-58, 210 P.2d at 315-17.
160. See, e.g., E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros., 158 Cal. App. 3d 728,736-37,204 Cal. Rptr. 838, 843-
45 (1984) (discussing testimonial evidence that the defendant's representative personally asked potential customers
what they were currently being charged, then beat that price, even though it was below cost).
161. See Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Med. Enters., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 496,499, 117 Cal. Rptr.
42, 45 (1974) (noting that doctors that would have rented space from the plaintiff accepted offers from the
defendant because the defendant offered below cost services in connection with their leases).
162. See G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 256, 267, 195 Cal. Rptr. 211,218 (1983) (agreeing with
the plaintiff's charge that secret rebates were a contributing cause in diverting business from, and thus injuring, the
plaintiff).
163. See Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811, 815-16,268 Cal. Rptr. 856, 857-
58 (1990).
164. Id. Testimony of a buyer that it transferred business to the defendant due to below cost pricing is forceful
direct evidence proving diversion and injurious effect. Id. A witness testified that the plaintiff's and defendant's
services were of equal quality, but the contract was awarded to the defendant because it was the lowest bidder. Id.
165. See Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d at 111-14, 153 P.2d at 11-13 (holding that selling 400 items below
cost for extended periods of time caused injury to competitors and destroyed competition without specifically
finding a diversion of business).
166. See Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 242, 248 P.2d 63, 68 (1952) (holding that selling three grocery
items as loss leaders did not have the effect of diverting trade or injuring any competitors); see also Dooley's
Hardware Mart v. Food Giant Mkts., Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 513, 517, 98 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1971) (finding no
evidence that use of three loss leaders diverted sales or injured competition in general, or as relates to the plaintiff
in particular).
167. See, e.g., Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Cal. 2d 199, 207-08,424 P.2d 486, 490-91, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878,
882-83 (1965). The defendant's below cost price was due to an error in following the usual procedures when there
was no competent cost accounting system for a new product, rather than an intentional act. Id.
168. See id, at 207,424 P.2d at 490,45 Cal. Rptr. at 882; Turnbull & Turnbull, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 816-19,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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The opinion in E & H Wholesale, Inc. v. Glaser Bros.1 69 discusses the types of
evidence typically introduced on the issue of injurious intent in a § 17043 action. The
president of the defendant corporation attempted to rebut the intent presumption by
testimony that it never acted to injure competition. However, the record also con-
tained a deposition of a corporate officer who stated that prices were set regardless
of cost, in order to beat competitors' prices by a nominal amount. Due to the con-
flicting testimony, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to a directed
verdict on the issue of intent.7
0
3. Affirmative Defenses
Given the current state of Ninth Circuit predatory pricing law under section (2)
of the Sherman Act, there would appear to be very little room for any affirmative
defenses for a company with a market share in the monopoly range that engages in
below average variable cost pricing.'17 In a predatory price action under section (2)(a)
of the RPA, only the "meeting competition" defense could possibly be statutorily
invoked by the defendant.t72 This defense, which applies when a discriminating seller
lowers its price to meet the equally low price of a competitor, would apply even to
a sale to the favored buyer at a price below cost. Under section 2(b) of the RPA, the
defendant would bear the burden of proving the elements of the defense.
173
California Business and Professions Code § 17050 describes five specific
situations in which a seller's below cost selling will not violate § 17043.174 Each
169. 158 Cal. Apt. 3d 728, 204 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1984).
170. E & H Wholesale, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 736-38, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
171. See supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit concept of average variable cost, which
is restricted to unique costs, ensures that only in rare, extremely low price sale situations will a plaintiff be able to
make a prima facie case. It is inconceivable that the type of extremely low prices needed for a prima facie case in
the Ninth Circuit could be defended on the basis that the defendant was meeting the competition from another
competitor. It is, in any event, somewhat doubtful that a "meeting competition" defense is availhble in an action
to enforce section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 142-43 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd in part and amended in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960).
172. There are three statutory defenses theoretically available to a defendant in a predatory price
discrimination case under section 2(a) of the RPA. The "changing conditions" defense is always unavailable in any
serious charge of predatory pricing. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (West 1973). The "cost justification" defense is
unavailable today because the United States Supreme Court requires proof that the defendant's price was below
its average variable costs. Hence there can be no cost savings on a particular sale that would justify the depth of
such price cuts. In any event, the defense has long been rendered a virtual dead letter due to traditional requirements
of accounting accuracy the defendant must meet in order to prove the exact amount of its savings. See Texaco, Inc.
v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 561 n.18 (1990). This leaves only the "meeting competition" defense as a practical
possibility in a predatory price action under section 2(a) of the RPA. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
173. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(b) (west 1973) (requiring the defendant to prove that the price charged was
established to meet the equally low price of a competitor). Under present law, the defendant is still protected by the
defense when it undercuts the low price offered by a competitor as lorig as it acted in a reasonable good faith effort
to match the competitor's price. See, e.g., Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FrC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 (1979); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422.453 (1978).
174. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17050 (West 1987).
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establishes a separate affirmative defense, and the defendant seller must plead and
prove that the specified fact situation existed at the time it made the challenged sales.
The affirmative defense situations described in § 17050 are when a seller is: selling
goods in connection with discontinuing its business, selling seasonal or perishable
goods after the optimal time for their sale, selling damaged goods, selling goods pur-
suant to a court order, and selling goods at a low price in a good faith effort to meet
a competitor's legal price.'75
Of these affirmative defenses, only the meeting competition defense has been
significant in reported cases. The defense is obviously available in situations in
which the defendant proves it was pricing below cost to meet the low prices of an
identified competitor.176 Less obviously, the defense is available to a defendant seller
who responds to general competition that has driven prices low in the market by
pricing its product below cost to meet the market price.
77
The defense requires that the defendant act in good faith to meet the legal prices
of a competitor. 71 The good faith requirement is not met if the defendant continues
its below cost selling for an unreasonable time after competitors raise their prices.7 9
The requirement also does not permit a defendant to lower its price below cost after
its competitors have raised their low prices back to normal, higher market levels. 80
Finally, the "legal price" requirement negates the meeting competition defense for
a defendant that lowers its prices below cost to meet prices of a competitor when the
defendant knows the competitor is violating the UPA by pricing below cost. 18 Rather
than sanction competitive lawbreaking, the court stated that "[e]ach side must obey
175. Id. § 17050 (a)-(e) (West 1987). The meeting competition defense set forth in subsection (d) applies to
wholesalers and retailers, and the terms of the defense set forth in subsection (e) apply to manufacturers.
176. See Sandier v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App. 2d 254,255-58,210 P.2d 314, 315-17 (1949) (awarding judgment
against the defendant for violating § 17043 and allowing the plaintiff to use the § 17050 "meeting legal prices"
defense for a cross-complaint filed by the defendant). The plaintiff and defendant, both diaper laundry operators,
filed complaints alleging various unfair and discriminatory business practices prohibited by the Unfair Practices
Act.
177. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT= Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410,423 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 82 F.3d 424 (9th Cir. 1996) and 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981). The bakery
industry was heavily competitive at the time of the controversy. Prices were dropping industry-wide, and
defendant's price decreases were a good faith response to the competition. The court of appeals reaffirmed the
district court's decision on this matter. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981).
178. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17050(d), (e) (West 1987).
179. See People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 153 P.2d 9, 12 (1944) (holding that even though
the defendant's price decreases were in response to competition, the defendant had Yept prices below cost for
"periods of weeks or months" after competitors raised prices).
180. See id. (stating that "in some cases defendant's sales below cost were not begun until 'weeks or months'
after similar advertised prices of competitors had been discontinued").
181. See Page v. Bakersfield Uniform & Towel Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 762, 764,49 Cal. Rptr. 46,48 (1966)
(issuing a permanent injunction order requiring both competitors in a "bitter-end laundry war" who repeatedly
violated various sections of the UPA to abstain from further breaches).
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the law; the fact that one competing party disregards the statute does not give the
other party a legal excuse to do so.' 8 2
4. Damages
The basic rules governing damages recoverable under the federal acts and the
UPA are the same.1 3 After the jury determines the amount of "actual damages"
suffered by the plaintiff, that figure must be trebled by the trial court judge, who has
no discretion in the matter.184 Because treble damages are punitive, a plaintiff cannot
recover additional punitive damages.8 5 Finally, a court must include an award of
"reasonable attorney's fees" to a successful plaintiff. 86 No award of attorneys fees
against an unsuccessful plaintiff is authorized under the statutes.
The basic measure of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff in a predatory
pricing action will be the profits lost by the plaintiff attributed to sales diverted to the
defendant by the below cost selling of the defendant. While this measure of damages
should be applied in private predatory price actions under either section 2 of the
Sherman Act or section 2(a) of the RPA, possible confusion could arise under either
statute because of the uncertain contours of the "antitrust injury" concept. 18 7 Under
the straightforward pattern for damage recovery under the UPA, there is no pos-
sibility for confusion. If the defendant's selling below cost directly caused the
plaintiff to lose an identifiable contract, damages are calculated by determining the
amount of profit the plaintiff lost because the contract was diverted to the defen-
dant.' u The same diversion test applies if ascertainable customers, but not necessarily
182. Id. at 770, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
183. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 1994) (providing for the recovery of damages by anyone injured "by
reason of' a violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts). Violations of section 2 of the RPA are included, because
that section replaced and became section 2 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 1994); see id. § 17070
(West 1987) (authorizing civil suits to enforce the UPA's provisions); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17082
(West 1987) (providing for mandatory trebling of the plaintiff's "actual damages").
184. See Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
"Congress's authorization in 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 to triple the award of damages is a matter of law to be applied by
the district court without interference from the jury"); Uneedus v. Califomia Shoppers, Inc., 86 Cal. App. 3d 932,
942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 596, 601-02 (1978) (holding that trebling of damages under Califomia Business & Professional
Code § 17082 is mandatory).
185. Turnbull & Turbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811, 826-27, 268 Cal. Rptr. 856, 865-66
(1990).
186. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17082 (West 1987).
187. The antitrust injury requirement in federal private treble damage actions was first announced in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,487-89 (1977). See generally James R. McCall, The
Disaggregation of Damages Requirement in Private Monopolization Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643,655-58
(1987).
188. See Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Med. Enters., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 496,499, 117 Cal. Rptr.
42,45 (1974). In Paramount General Hospital, the plaintiffs pleaded damages in the amount lost due to diversion
of lease packages for medical space from the plaintiff to the defendant: $11,000 in lost rentals and $796,000 in lost
income from patients of two types. The first type of lost income was the loss of profits from diverted medical office
leases that the plaintiffs would have made with identifiable doctors. The second type of damage was for lost profits
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ascertainable contracts, were lost due to the defendant's below cost selling. 89
Damages are equal to the profits that would have been made on the reasonably
estimated sales by the plaintiff to the diverted customers.tg°
California courts have indicated that in cases in which the plaintiff could prove
that neither specific contracts nor specific customers had been diverted, an award of
damages would be proper under the UPA.19' If the plaintiff and the predatory pricing
defendant were competing in a retail consumer market characterized by high volume
cash sales, § 17043 could not be enforced unless the plaintiff could recover damages
on the basis of reasonable estimates of plaintiffs lost sales volume resulting from
defendant's predatory pricing.' 92
mn. Loss LEADER PRICING UNDER THE FEDERAL LAW AND THE UPA
Case law under section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 2(a) of the RPA has not
focused upon loss leader pricing. Absent the development of special rules for
detecting the practice by courts, those statutes will continue to be inadequate vehicles
for damage recovery by plaintiffs injured by the practice. The UPA specifically con-
demns and defines loss leader pricing and is easily invoked by such plaintiffs.
California Business and Professions Code § 17044, a companion provision to §
17043, prohibits the use of "loss leaders" in the pricing of products. 93 A loss leader
is defined in California Business and Professions Code § 17030 as an item sold at
less than cost where: (a) the purpose of the seller is to induce the purchase of other
merchandise, or (b) the effect is a tendency to deceive purchasers, or (c) the effect
is to divert trade from or injure competitors.14 Although § 17030 uses the term "mer-
chandise," the section has been held to apply to services.195 Neither § 17044 nor §
17030 require proof of a defendant seller's intent to injure competition or compe-
titors. Nonetheless, California courts have held that a plaintiff must prove that the
that plaintiffs would have made in selling various medical services (pharmaceutical, radiological) to the patients
the identified doctors would have brought to the plaintiffs' building. The court held "that plaintiffs have stated a
cause of action for damages... based on a violation of section 17043." Id. at 504, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
189. Id. at 499, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
190. See Sandier v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App. 2d 254, 258-59, 210 P.2d 314, 316-17 (1949). In Sandier, the
plaintiff showed 34 customers were temporarily lost and 39 customers were permanently lost to the defendant
because of below cost pricing. A certified public accountant calculated the lost revenue that the plaintiff would have
received from those customers and deducted the various expenses to compute the plaintiff's actual damages.
191. See Paramount Gen. Hosp., 42 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 45; G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal.
App. 3d 256, 275, 195 Cal. Rptr. 211, 223 (1983). The plaintiff and defendant sold records at retail to
unascertainable customers. The court held that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for damages for "lost
customers and profits" under § 17043. G.H.LL, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
192. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Both the Paramount General Hospital and G.H.LL opinions
involved retail, high volume, cash sales.
193. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (West 1987).
194. Id. § 17030 (West 1987).
195. See Garner v. Journeyman Barbers' Union, 223 Cal. App. 2d 101, 107, 35 Cal.. Rptr. 693, 697 (1963)
(holding that barber services are covered under definition of "loss leader").
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defendant acted with the intent to injure competitors to sustain a § 17044 cause of
action. 96 The UPA section establishing a presumption of intent to injure competitors
in alleged predatory pricing situations 97 is applicable to the court-declared intent re-
quirement of § 17044.198 There is also a special "injurious intent" presumption
section in the UPA that applies in certain loss leader situations!"
California Business and Professions Code § 17071.5 creates a presumption of the
defendant's injurious intent if the seller prices a product below cost and limits the
quantity of that product that can be purchased by a buyer.' ° The section only applies
to sales by retailers who purchase commodities from others and resell them to con-
sumers."I The section has been held constitutional,' and the presumption is con-
sidered to be one that shifts the burden of proof under California Evidence Code §
605.20
As discussed previously,2 4 a number of affirmative defenses are available to
defendants in predatory price cases. 05 The same defenses are available in loss leader
actions, and the meeting competition defense has been successfully invoked in one
reported opinion.20
IV. CONCLUSION
The UPA was written in specific terms at a time when predatory pricing was
viewed as a frequently used and highly effective method of stamping out competitors
to the great loss of consumers. The federal statutes were written in much broader
terms and have been interpreted in broad or narrow fashion depending upon changes
in the prevailing economic thought among antitrust judges. In large part due to the
fact that the prohibitions in the UPA were "frozen" by precise statutory drafting in
a previous era, plaintiffs complaining of lost profits because of-below cost selling are
well advised to consider the California UPA as a vehicle for recovery.
196. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234,238-39,248 P.2d 63,65-66 (1952). But see McCarthy,
supra note 10, at 181 (criticizing this position).
197. See supra Part 3I.B.2.
198. See HIadek v. City of Merced, 69 Cal. App. 3d 585, 591 n.3, 138 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198 n.3 (1977);
Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Food Giant Mkts., Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 513, 516, 98 Cal. Rptr. 543, 544 (1971).
199. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17071.5 (West 1987).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Food Giant Mkts, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 3d 105, 107-08, 81 Cal. Rptr. 451, 452-
53 (1969).
203. Dooley's Hardware Mart, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 517-18, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46; see supra notes 154-58
and accompanying text (discussing California Evidence Code § 605 and § 606 in connection with California
Business and Professions Code § 17071).
204. See supra Part II.B.3.
205. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 17050 (West 1987).
206. See Dooley's Hardware Mart, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 518-19, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (holding that the
defendant's use of three grocery items as loss leaders was part of an effort to meet competition, not done with intent
to injure).
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Specifically, the difference in the crucial measure of the relevant cost of the
seller is enough to recommend the California statute for competitors injured within
the state. The other differences between the possibly applicable federal acts and the
UPA all point in the same direction, indicating the UPA as a far easier statutory
cause of action to establish. Those differences include the lack of any requirement
to prove any facts other than the existence of a predatory sale in § 17043, the direct
nature of damage recovery under the UPA, and the ease of proving necessary intent
under that Act. All firms selling in the California market and all attorneys who advise
them on commercial and trade regulation matters should be aware of the facility the
UPA offers to competitors injured by predatory pricing.

